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Earlier this week, the Arbitration Act 2025 (the “AA 2025”) received Royal Assent. The AA 2025 introduces significant modifications to the Arbitration Act 1996 (the “AA 1996”) in a bid to modernise and streamline the arbitral process in England and Wales, and to amplify London’s foothold as a leading arbitration hub.

Although London is already generally regarded as the preferred seat for arbitration globally, it is hoped that the AA 2025 will “turbocharge” that position and continue to attract international business to the UK¹, supporting an infrastructure that is said by the Law Commission to contribute at least £2.5 billion annually to the UK economy.²

On implementation (and that date remains to be confirmed), the AA 2025 will promote a fairer, more efficient arbitration process, clarifying previous “grey areas” in the law, safeguarding the integrity of the process and providing swifter and more cost-effective options for parties.

We summarise the key developments introduced by the AA 2025 below.

Clarifies governing law

• Determining the law applicable to arbitration agreements has long been a contentious topic. Even the leading English authority on the point acknowledges that “On one side there are those who say that the law that governs a contract should generally also govern an arbitration agreement which, though separable, forms part of that contract. On the other side there are those who say that the law of the chosen seat of the arbitration should also generally govern the arbitration agreement. There have been Court of Appeal decisions falling on either side of this divide: Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v Enesa Engenharia SA [2013] 1 WLR 102 and C v D [2008] Bus LR 843.” See also Enka v Chubb [2020] UKSC 38 and our analysis of that judgment here.
• The AA 2025 seeks to demystify this, confirming that where an agreement to arbitrate is silent as to its governing law, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement will be that of the seat of the arbitration in question (section 1(2)(1)(b), AA 2025).
• While this provides necessary clarity on the point, and should in turn improve arbitration efficiency by limiting the scope for satellite disputes on governing law, parties should nevertheless be mindful that careful drafting remains paramount. The AA 2025 states that parties’ agreement that a particular governing law will apply to an agreement of which the arbitration agreement forms a part will not constitute express agreement that that law will necessarily apply to the arbitration agreement itself (section 1(2)(2), AA 2025). It is therefore not sufficient to add one general governing law clause applicable to the contract as a whole if that contract also contains a separate agreement to arbitrate.
• When drafting, parties should ensure that agreements contain both: (i) a clear governing law and jurisdiction clause that applies to the agreement as a whole; and (ii) where the contract contains an agreement to arbitrate, also specify the governing law and seat of any prospective arbitration, using the applicable model clause of the parties’ chosen arbitral body.

Mitigates potential arbitrator conflicts

• The AA 2025 seeks to provide the arbitration community with welcome comfort in circumstances where an arbitrator may appear conflicted or biased.
• The AA 1996 already provides a route by which an arbitrator may be removed by the court on the grounds of justifiable doubts as to their impartiality. However, section 2(2) of the AA 2025 goes further and imposes a duty on prospective and confirmed arbitrators to proactively disclose to the parties any “relevant circumstances” that “might reasonably give rise to justifiable doubts” about that individual’s impartiality in the arbitral proceedings.

Enhances arbitrator immunity

• Arbitrator immunity is key to a strong arbitration framework because it enables an arbitrator “to make robust and impartial decisions without fear that a party will express their disappointment by suing [them]” and it complements the conclusiveness of the arbitration process.³
• The AA 1996 goes some way towards promoting arbitrator immunity in respect of the arbitrator’s discharge of its functions, but historically the position has been different where an arbitrator resigns or is removed. For example, the AA 1996 provides that an arbitrator, if removed by a court for reasons including impartiality, qualification, capacity or conduct, may be subject to a court order in respect of the arbitrator’s entitlement to fees or expenses, or the repayment of the same if already paid (section 24(4), AA 1996). The AA 2025 seeks to address this, by confirming that, before such costs order can be made against an arbitrator, it must first be shown that an act or omission of the arbitrator was in “bad faith” (section 3(2), AA 2025). While bad faith is a relatively fluid concept, it is assumed that some level of intentional dishonesty should be present to establish that motive – a bar which should give arbitrators further reassurance when discharging their duties in a vigorous but impartial manner.
• Arbitrator immunity from liability following their resignation is similarly enhanced by the AA 2025, which introduces a “reasonableness” test. Section 4(3)(b) of the AA 2025 confirms that an arbitrator’s resignation must be shown to be “in all the circumstances, unreasonable” before an arbitrator may face liability.
• These modifications complement those seen elsewhere in the AA 2025 relating to arbitrator conflicts and, taken together, mark a significant step forward in protecting and supporting arbitrators to facilitate impartial proceedings and unbiased decisions.

Tribunal’s ability to grant interim relief

• Further changes contained in the AA 2025 shore up the powers afforded to emergency arbitrators, again encouraging efficiency and early compliance with the arbitral process.
• Section 8 of the AA 2025 provides that where an emergency arbitrator has been appointed and a party fails to comply with any order or directions of that emergency arbitrator, the emergency arbitrator may make a peremptory order to the same effect. The AA 2025 goes further still, providing a route that enables the English courts to intervene in support of such orders made by emergency arbitrators. This is particularly important as emergency arbitrators are typically replaced down the line in an arbitration by a finally-constituted tribunal. The AA 2025’s steps to safeguard emergency relief provides welcome consistency and integrity to the broader arbitration process, encourages compliance with emergency orders and provides a clear enforcement route in the event of non-compliance.

Tribunal’s ability to make provisional awards, including summary dismissal

• Unlike the AA 1996, the AA 2025 confirms that, by default and unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a tribunal may make an award on a summary basis in relation to a claim, or on a particular issue arising in the claim, where such claim, issue or defence has no real prospect of success (section 7(1), AA 2025).
• While parties must first be afforded the opportunity to make representations to the tribunal on such issues (section 7(3), AA 2025), this “opt-out” modification is designed to expedite decisions on weak issues, claims or defences that have no real prospect of success – therefore reducing procedural and administrative delays and costs for parties by improving efficiency.

Limits jurisdictional challenges to awards

• Sections 10-11 of the AA 2025 modify the provisions of the AA 1996 by limiting the circumstances in which a court may entertain jurisdictional challenges to tribunal awards. In doing so, the AA 2025 seeks to improve the efficiency of such jurisdictional challenges, streamlining the circumstances in which they may be brought with the aim of avoiding unnecessary delay, cost and duplication.
• The new provisions confirm that where: (i) the tribunal has already ruled on the given objection to its substantive jurisdiction; and (ii) the challenging application is made by a party that took part in the arbitral proceedings, a jurisdictional challenge may be heard by the courts only in limited circumstances. Challenges may not be entertained by the courts (unless in the interests of justice): (i) where the ground for objection was not raised before the tribunal but was known at the time or could have been discovered by reasonable diligence; or (ii) where evidence was not put to the tribunal but could have been put to the tribunal with reasonable diligence; or (iii) where the same evidence was heard by the tribunal (that is, the same evidence cannot be re-heard by the court).

With expertise across all forms of dispute resolution, Weil’s Disputes and Investigations team frequently advise on the most significant arbitrations across the globe and have experience before a number of major arbitral institutions including the LCIA, ICC, UNCITRAL, HKIAC and SIAC. For further information regarding the AA 2025, please contact the authors below or your usual contact

1. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/boost-for-uk-economy-as-arbitration-act-receives-royal-assent ↩︎
2. Law Commission’s Review of the Arbitration Act 1996: Final report and Bill at paragraph 1.4  ↩︎
3. Law Commission’s Review of the Arbitration Act 1996: Final report and Bill at paragraph 5.7  ↩︎